This paper was originally presented at *A Shared Future: Fostering Communities of Inclusion in an Era of Inequality*, a national symposium hosted by the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies in April 2017. The symposium examined how patterns of residential segregation by income and race in the United States are changing and the consequences of residential segregation for individuals and society, and sought to identify the most promising strategies for fostering more inclusive communities in the years to come.

This paper was presented as part of Panel 3 at the symposium, entitled “What would it take… To make new and remake old neighborhoods so that regions move decisively toward integration?”

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Introduction

What would it take to make new and remake old neighborhoods so that a large, complex, metropolitan area moved decisively toward integration by race and income in the next 15 years? This paper provides background for the following case studies in this volume that try to answer this question in three regions: Chicago, Houston, and Washington, DC. The paper begins with a broad-brush overview of the major demographic changes that are expected to continue transforming housing markets in the US: population growth, aging, racial and ethnic diversity, and shifting household composition. It then describes the two principal patterns of political geography in metropolitan areas that affect decisionmaking about neighborhood inclusion: fragmentation and polycentricity. In the final two sections, the paper shows how national population growth trends could play out in each of the three commuting zones (CZs, analogous to metropolitan areas).\(^1\) It then closes with a discussion of the political geography of each region, offering thoughts about how fragmentation and polycentricity influence how the authors of the three case-study papers answer the question for the panel.

Population Growth and Change, 2015-2040

The US is becoming more diverse by age, race and ethnicity, household composition, and income even as its population continues to grow. Major metropolitan areas are the crucible of these changes. They account for most of the nation’s population growth and a disproportionate share of its non-white population, have a greater diversity of household types and sizes, and feature much sharper income inequality than the rest of the US. Their responses to aging, diversification, and growth will likely have an outsized impact on the future of the entire nation.

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1. I use commuting zones (CZs) rather than metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) because the Urban Institute develops CZ–based population projections by age and race. One advantage of CZs over MSAs is that they take in both urban and rural areas; the entire territory of the US is in a CZ. The three CZs this paper explores overlap substantially with year-2013 MSAs defined by the Office of Management and Budget. Some outlying counties in each case do not overlap.
Growth

The US has faster population growth than many other large, high-income countries. A mid-range projection by the US Census Bureau suggests that the nation is on track to add over 70 million people between 2010 and 2040. The 20 most populous commuting zones in 2010, where almost 125 million of the 309 million US residents lived, could grow by nearly 28 million people, or 11 million additional households. Five of these commuting zones—Los Angeles, Houston, Washington, Atlanta, and Phoenix—would add over 1 million households each. (Dallas-Fort Worth, if considered as a single region instead of two commuting zones, would also rank among the areas adding over 1 million households from 2010 to 2040). Among all 741 commuting zones, however, around 300 could lose population over these three decades if recent trends persist, the largest of which are in the Great Lakes states.

Older Adults

Across the nation, local decisionmakers face unprecedented growth in the number of older adults. Baby boomers are aging into their late 60s and 70s, following a much smaller generation. They also are expected to live longer than previous generations, magnifying the impact of their large numbers. Already, thanks to the growth in lifetime income and wealth that boomers have enjoyed, these older adults remain living by themselves in their own homes in much greater proportion than older adults of just two decades ago. At the same time, however, boomers are more racially diverse and more unequal by income and wealth than was the preceding generation. This diversity will therefore translate into increasing numbers not just of affluent homeowners in their 70s and 80s, but also of poor elderly renters, many of whom may not live as long as their more privileged contemporaries.

We still can only guess at the impacts of growing numbers of older adults on local housing markets. It may be that, like previous generations, baby boomers will have a low propensity to move; even so, the purchasing power even of a small proportion of this much larger population of older adults could encourage unforeseen innovations in housing that profoundly change many US metropolitan areas. These innovations could reduce relocation costs, resulting in greater propensity to relocate to a different housing unit, either within the same metropolitan area or elsewhere. Innovations and changes in demand could also shift
property owners’ calculus about how to use their homes, apartments, and parcels, and their perspective on what counts as adequate local infrastructure.

**Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Immigration**

At the same time, the nation is becoming more diverse, especially at younger ages, across numerous dimensions. Nationally, Hispanics, African Americans, Asians, and multiracial people are expected to account for nearly 90 percent of the net growth in households between now and 2030, as the rate of mortality among older white non-Hispanics approaches the rate of household formation by young white non-Hispanics. Many of these new households will remain renters for more of their life courses, since Hispanic and African American homeownership rates still lag behind those of white non-Hispanics by between 25 and 30 percentage points, with Asians trending about 10 percentage points below whites. If housing prices fall, incomes rise, and access to homeownership become easier to obtain via policy and market innovation, then many young adults of color with parents who have little wealth could become homeowners, resulting in stable or rising homeownership rates overall and a smoother handoff from baby boomer homeowners to their heirs. If the stars do not align well enough, however, then some metropolitan areas could face long-term turbulence in both their rental and their homeownership markets.

**Household Composition**

Household compositions have also become steadily more diverse, a trend that shows no sign of abating. Single-person households have become much more common, in part because some people live by themselves for decades but also because people’s adult household status will differ across their life course to a greater extent than was the case for people born in the first half of the 20th century. People already spend a longer period in their 20s and 30s unmarried and/or without children, sometimes living with parents and sometimes alone. The decisions to have children and to marry have become less closely linked. With higher divorce rates among baby boomers compared with previous generations, the large growth in older households will also mean large growth in in single-person households. Along with this diversification by both race and composition, households have also become more diverse by wealth and income, a trend that shows no signs of abating anytime soon.
Political Geography: Landscapes of Inclusion and Exclusion

As the US grows, ages, and diversifies in the next 25 years, what are the chances that the nation will see a growth in inclusive neighborhoods? The answer to this question depends in large part on the geography of the municipalities, townships, and counties in which these neighborhoods are located, because in every state—even those with growth management systems—local governments set rules and manage approval processes for residential growth: where, how much, and what types of housing can be built, as well as what community services must be provided to accompany it. Cities and counties also conduct an array of other activities that shape neighborhood change: programs for redevelopment of blighted areas, housing rehabilitation, affordable housing, and many others.

Fragmentation: The Tiebout Landscape of the Northeast and Midwest

In commuting zones dominated by small municipalities and townships, a small number of jurisdictions—usually medium-sized to large cities—accounts for a disproportionate share of the less expensive rental stock, including subsidized housing. Such commuting zones predominate in the Northeast and Midwest, in part because of the longstanding tradition of local land-use control and infrastructure governance at the town (New England) or township (mid-Atlantic and Midwest) level.

The small municipalities in these CZs have political and fiscal incentives that push them toward internal homogeneity. According to some theories, notably Charles Tiebout’s, people choose to live in these communities based on their preferences for public services and their willingness to pay for them. These preferences also extend to their willingness to share facilities and neighborhoods with people of other races and income levels. Because people and businesses can “vote with their feet,” local decisionmakers must follow their taxpaying, voting, and campaign-contributing constituents’ preferences or face either electoral defeat or exit. Zoning is a necessary element for controlling the amount and character of development,

according to these theories, because zoning imposes barriers to entry on people who might consume more public services than they are able to pay for. Zoning limits housing density and otherwise makes rental housing hard to build and expensive to occupy, reducing the number of people of color and low-income households who can live there.  

CZs in New England, the mid-Atlantic states, and the Midwest also have a number of characteristics that have allowed housing construction to outpace housing demand at the regional scale. Small, pro-growth jurisdictions at the urban fringe accommodate builders’ and landowners’ development applications, often on large lots with on-site septic systems and wells rather than public sewers and water systems, both of which are preconditions for dense development. As new supply comes on-line for the most affluent households at the regional fringe, older housing close to the urban core loses its value and becomes subject to absentee ownership, vacancy, and abandonment. Galster calls this “the regional housing disassembly line.”

The pathways to inclusion in these fragmented CZs almost certainly have to involve at least some action by either state legislatures or federal and state courts. Massachusetts’ “anti-snob zoning” law, Chapter 40B, is a long-standing example of a mandate for inclusion that came about because of Boston’s political strength in the state legislature in the late 1960s; the law allows developers to appeal local denials of affordable housing proposals to a state override board and has been responsible for the production of tens of thousands of housing units since its enactment. Recent changes to state law have complemented it with fiscal incentives to suburban towns that agree to zone for denser housing development. Another route has been through legal challenges, exemplified by the Mount Laurel and Westchester cases. In all these cases, more exclusive communities are being forced to reduce their barriers to affordable housing construction.

Segregation among cities and townships (whose boundaries often coincide with school-district boundaries) has eroded in some of these CZs in recent years as inner suburban housing has aged and become more affordable to low-income households and people of color, with immigrants playing an important role in the diversification of some suburbs.⁹ This growth in suburban diversity can be one route to the erosion of exclusionary practices in more affluent and whiter communities; Orfield describes a process in Minnesota in which state legislators from Minneapolis and St. Paul aligned with suburban representatives in a legislative coalition that improved regional planning for growth management and inclusion.¹⁰ Coalitions of inner suburbs have also emerged in Cleveland and St. Louis, spurred in part by organizing by the faith-based Gamaliel organization.¹¹

**Polycentricity: Urban Politics in Suburban Metropolitan Areas of the South and West**

The local political geographies in the South and West differ fundamentally from those in the Midwest and Northeast. Counties make decisions about land development in unincorporated areas, and townships do not exist as independent decisionmaking entities. These CZs tend, therefore, to be less jurisdictionally fragmented than those in the Midwest and Northeast, though the precise degree depends in part on state laws and constitutional provisions on annexation and incorporation. Where incorporation is relatively challenging and annexation easy, as was the case in Texas for most of its history, large cities dominate the landscape. Where incorporation is easy and annexation challenging, by contrast, CZs can become quite fragmented. Because medium-sized to large jurisdictions cover so much territory in these CZs, the politics of suburban development can be much less predictable than in the fragmented “Tiebout landscape” of the Northeast and Midwest. Elected officials need to respond to electoral pressure not only from the “median voter,” but also from small interest groups with intense interests, including landowners, builders, business leaders, civil rights organizations, community organizers, and others. That is, the politics can resemble urban politics. And with a smaller number of neighboring jurisdictions, elected and appointed officials

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⁹ Orfield (1997).
¹¹ Swanstrom (2006); Keating and Bier (2008).
understand more clearly that they cannot rely entirely on other cities or counties to accommodate all the low-cost housing.

While local decisionmakers in these less fragmented CZs may not be able or want to exclude low-income people and renters entirely from their borders, they often face intense pressure to keep people separated into homogeneous neighborhoods or districts. In these cases, the politics around housing development and subsidy often reflect the boundaries of school districts. Some western CZs also have a high degree of school-district fragmentation. Where a county has a single school district (as in most of the South), the politics of exclusion revolve around school attendance zones, with homeowners in public-school attendance areas where school test scores are high and students are predominantly white and Asian rallying to limit incursions by developers of low-cost and rental housing.

Houston, Chicago, and Washington, DC: Three Metropolitan Settings for Working Toward Inclusion

Houston, Chicago, and Washington are three of the largest metropolitan areas in the US, with 3.4 million households in the Chicago commuting zone and about 2.4 million each in Houston and Washington in 2010. They also have substantial political complexity, with dozens of cities, multiple counties, and myriad special districts and school districts making decisions that affect housing supply and demand. The relationship between the central cities and other jurisdictions, too, varies: Chicago and Houston are both the largest jurisdictions in their commuting zones, whereas Washington, DC has a smaller residential population than three large suburban counties in Maryland and Virginia.

Segregation

All three regions are known for their racial and economic segregation, but here, too, there are differences (Figures 1a-1c). Of the top 100 commuting zones in the US, Chicago ranked 20th in the nation in 2010 for economic segregation, 10th for black-white segregation, and 9th for Hispanic-white segregation. Washington’s economic segregation level is higher—17th in the nation—but its black-white and Hispanic-white segregation levels are notably lower (34th and 49th). Houston, finally, has the lowest economic and black-white segregation of the
three areas (28th and 45th, respectively), but higher Hispanic-white segregation than Washington (20th).

**Figure 1a. Combined Economic and Racial Segregation, 100 Most Populous Commuting Zones, 2010**


Note: Darker shades of blue indicate lower combined ranks and thus more segregated CZs. The combined rank is the unweighted average of black-white, Hispanic-white, and income-based segregation as measured by the spatial proximity index (a measure of racial clustering) and the generalized neighborhood sorting index (a measure of income clustering).
Figure 1b. Economic Segregation: Most Advantaged and Most Disadvantaged 10 Percent of Census Tracts in Chicago, Houston, and Washington Commuting Zones, 2006-10

Note: Index based on a composite score of average household income, percent of adults with college degrees, percent homeownership, and median housing value. Blue areas are the highest 10 percent of tracts; orange areas are the lowest 10 percent of tracts, 2006-10.
Growth

Recent and projected future growth trends for these three commuting zones range from very rapid in Houston to moderate in Chicago (Figure 2). From 1990 to 2010, the Houston CZ
experienced 52 percent growth in households; Washington households grew by 33 percent, and households in Chicago grew 18 percent. The magnitude of household growth from 1990 to 2010 is impressive: Houston added 681,000, Washington 502,000, and Chicago 460,000. If future growth trends resemble those of the recent past, each region, because of its youth, diversity, and attractiveness for economic activity, would add even more new households in this decade and the 2020s. Between 2010 and 2030, Houston could add another 850,000 households or more, Washington over 725,000, and Chicago another half million households.12 Like the rest of the nation, all three of these CZs will add a substantial number of older adult households over the next two decades (Figure 3). By 2030, over 1.1 million Chicago households are likely to be headed by someone aged 65 or older, compared with only 610,000 in 2010. Both Houston and Washington are likely to grow to over 700,000 older adult households in 2030 and over 800,000 in 2040, up from between 300,000 and 350,000 in 2010. The regions differ, however, in the growth prospects for households headed by people under 65 years old. If recent demographic trends hold in the next 25 years, then Chicago has apparently peaked at about 2.5 million households with a householder under 65 years old, whereas both Washington and Houston are on track to add between 600,000 and 700,000 households with householders under 65 years old from 2010 to 2040.

12. These projections use the Urban Institute’s Mapping America’s Futures local population projections, August 2015 vintage, and assume trends in household formation and homeownership attainment that will be documented in a forthcoming appendix.
Figure 2. Households, 1990-2010 Observed and 2010-2040 Projected, Chicago, Houston, and Washington Commuting Zones

![Graph showing household numbers from 1990 to 2040 for Chicago, Houston, and Washington. Sources: U.S. Census, Urban Institute projections.](image)

Figure 3. Households Headed by Older Adults and People Under Age 65, Chicago, Houston, and Washington Commuting Zones, 1990-2040

![Graph showing older adults and people under age 65 from 1990 to 2040 for Chicago, Houston, and Washington. Sources: U.S. Census, Urban Institute projections.](image)
In all three CZs, the bulk of the household growth is likely to be produced by increasing numbers of people of color (Figure 4). Already by 2010, no racial or ethnic group accounted for the majority of Houston’s householders; white non-Hispanic householders in Houston will peak at about 1.0 million in the 2020s, and sometime in the 2030s Hispanics will surpass whites as the group with the largest number of householders. Washington is about to surpass Chicago among these three CZs with the largest number of black householders and will also experience robust growth in Hispanic and other-race householders. Chicago, finally, will continue to experience household growth almost entirely on the basis of growth in its Hispanic, Asian, and multiracial households. Black household growth has slowed significantly in Chicago and would turn negative in the 2020s if recent trends continue.

Figure 4. Households by Race of Householder, Chicago, Houston, and Washington Commuting Zones, 1990-2040

Sources: U.S. Census, Urban Institute projections.

Notwithstanding the national trend of fast-growing demand for rental housing, all three of these CZs have homeownership attainment trends that tilt toward homeownership (Figure 5). They all had higher homeownership rates in 2010 than they did in 2000. Hispanics and other-race non-Hispanics account for bigger shares of their population and households than the national average, and both groups have in recent years exhibited stronger growth (or less decline) in homeownership than white and black non-Hispanics. Black non-Hispanics in
Washington outnumber Hispanics and others, but their homeownership exceeds the national average and fell less in the recent crisis than did black homeownership in other parts of the US.

**Figure 5. Households by Tenure, Chicago, Houston, and Washington Commuting Zones, 1990-2040**

[Graph image]

Sources: U.S. Census, Urban Institute projections.

**Local Political Landscapes as Fields of Play for Inclusive Growth**

The three CZs discussed in this paper also have different geographies of land-use and housing decisionmaking that shape the locus of action for efforts to boost inclusion in different kinds of neighborhoods. The papers by Novara and Khare (Chicago) and Fulton and Shelton (Houston) both focus mainly or exclusively on the central city as the main actor in pursuing inclusive policies; Lung-Amam (Washington), by contrast, goes decisively to the regional level with her paper. While this may seem inconsistent, the underlying principle is quite consistent: focus energy for political change where the payoff is greatest.

Chicago’s political geography exemplifies fragmented land-use and housing decisionmaking. It has 302 villages, cities, and counties that exercise control over planning, zoning, and subdivision regulations within a state legislative framework that allows much and demands little in the way of economic and racial inclusion or exclusion (Table 1). The city of Chicago accounts for 34 percent of the CZ population, but over 40 percent of the population lives in municipalities and unincorporated county areas with fewer than 50,000 residents. Apart
from Chicago, only six jurisdictions have more than 100,000 residents, and none of these has more than 250,000. That is, the Chicago CZ conspicuously lacks a tier of medium-sized jurisdictions. Given the disappointing results of the Affordable Housing Planning and Appeals Act of 2004, an “anti-snob zoning” law modeled on Massachusetts’s Chapter 40B, action to reduce exclusion in the more affluent suburbs looks from ground level like more effort than it may be worth, while efforts to boost the predominantly low-income African American suburbs south and west of Chicago could be at least as challenging, considering their very low level of municipal capacity.

Logically, then, Novara and Khare spend most of their time on tactics to integrate higher-opportunity and distressed neighborhoods in Chicago itself. They point out that the political energy and policy innovation have centered mainly on sustaining affordability in gentrification-prone neighborhoods and to an extent on creating more opportunity in safe, high-opportunity neighborhoods with dense and diverse housing, decent elementary schools, and good access to transit. But many other Chicago neighborhoods have suffered disinvestment and population loss for so long that they face dim prospects for near-term redevelopment. Reducing the concentration of new affordable housing in these neighborhoods seems like a logical necessity, but what resources does the city have to stimulate economic development and attract middle-class households to these neighborhoods?
Table 1. Land-Use Decisionmaking Jurisdictions, Chicago, Houston, and Washington, 2010

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Population of Jurisdiction (thousands)</th>
<th>Chicago Jurisdictions</th>
<th>Houston Jurisdictions</th>
<th>Washington Jurisdictions</th>
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<td>Population</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>302</td>
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</table>

| Percent of total                       | Jurisdictions | Population | Jurisdictions | Population | Jurisdictions | Population |
|                                       |              |            |              |            |              |            |
| <10                                    | 46%          | 7%         | 66%          | 3%         | 69%          | 3%         |
| 10-25                                  | 30%          | 18%        | 18%          | 6%         | 11%          | 4%         |
| 25-50                                  | 15%          | 17%        | 7%           | 5%         | 4%           | 3%         |
| 50-100                                 | 7%           | 17%        | 4%           | 6%         | 6%           | 7%         |
| 100-250                                | 2%           | 9%         | 1%           | 3%         | 5%           | 13%        |
| 250-500                                | 0%           | 0%         | 2%           | 12%        | 2%           | 12%        |
| 500-1M                                 | 0%           | 0%         | 0%           | 0%         | 3%           | 38%        |
| 1M+                                    | 0%           | 32%        | 2%           | 65%        | 1%           | 19%        |

Source: U.S. Census 2010.

Like Novara and Khare, Fulton and Shelton place most of their emphasis on the largest city in their CZ, but for another reason: it’s practically the only jurisdiction with enough population to make a difference. The city of Houston accounts for 37 percent of the CZ’s population, but another 28 percent of the CZ’s population (1.6 million) lives in unincorporated areas within Harris County, mostly in the extraterritorial jurisdictions of Houston (which extend up to five miles beyond its city limits) or smaller municipalities. (Texas cities’ authority to regulate subdivisions, issue building permits, and enforce building codes—but not to zone—extends into extraterritorial jurisdictions [ETJs], unincorporated areas whose boundaries range from one-half mile to five miles beyond city limits.) Texas grants broad land-use planning, zoning, and subdivision regulation to its home-rule cities (including most of the cities in the CZ), but does not require any of these controls; as Fulton and Shelton note, Houston does not have
zoning but instead uses other regulations to accomplish many of the purposes of zoning. Counties in Texas do not have power to zone unincorporated areas beyond ETJs, having been extended only the prerogative of subdivision regulation and building permit approval. Only one other city, Pasadena, has more than 100,000 people. But the dominance of Houston and Harris County means that only 14 percent of the CZ’s residents live in jurisdictions under 50,000 residents.

Initiatives within the city of Houston itself therefore have the potential to make a significant difference in access to opportunity. The city still has large amounts of vacant land and many thousands of acres in locations where it would be profitable to increase development density. Low-income residents currently live in many of these areas and are actively being displaced, but state law provides few mechanisms that allow cities to negotiate with developers to preserve affordability in gentrifying areas. Fewer tools yet are available to make inroads on inclusion in the unincorporated county areas where much new development occurs. No unit of local government can exercise much influence there on new development, especially beyond the ETJ, where developers can bypass city approvals for sewer and water connections by creating their own municipal utility districts (MUDs), special-purpose governments that finance infrastructure development on bonds that are repaid through property taxes on new residents.

With 602,000 residents in 2010, Washington, DC, is only the fourth-largest jurisdiction in its CZ; Fairfax (VA), Montgomery (MD), and Prince George’s (MD) counties each have more residents. Six other counties and one city have over 100,000 residents. Only 9 percent of the CZ population lives in jurisdictions under 50,000 residents. Counties are strong units of government in both Maryland and Virginia for planning and zoning; in Maryland, they sometimes control zoning and building permits even within incorporated cities. Virginia’s incorporated cities (e.g., Alexandria) are not sub-units of its counties, and they generally cannot annex outlying territory. Maryland is well-known as a “smart growth” state, requiring its jurisdictions to adopt comprehensive plans that designate areas for development and for

preservation consistent with state law; state funds for significant infrastructure development are channeled to the “priority funding areas” developed as part of the planning process. Montgomery County in particular has led the nation in its adoption of a transfer of development rights program to preserve rural land by allowing development credit transfers from rural to urban areas, and also in its long-standing Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit ordinance, a productive local source of affordable housing that has resulted in substantial income mixing within developments throughout the county. Virginia’s cities and counties do not face such state-level requirements; on the contrary, the prevailing “Dillon’s rule” character of the state leads to the interpretation that local authority to do anything rests on explicit state grants of power. The District of Columbia, finally, has controlled its own land use since the 1970s Home Rule Act was passed. Development on non-federal land (about 75 percent of the city) is governed by the District’s comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, the main federal constraint to which is a maximum building height limit of 130 feet.

As Lung-Amam’s paper shows, the Washington region’s more affluent jurisdictions and the District itself have innovated for decades to build and preserve affordable housing. Yet the intensity of housing demand, especially given the region’s rising income inequality, can make local advocates feel that it is already too late to turn back the tides of gentrification that are undermining affordability, transforming neighborhoods beyond recognition, and leading increasing numbers of lower-income young people (especially African Americans and Latinos) to live in suburban areas rather than in the District. To keep up with these changes in the region’s housing market, Lung-Amam argues, the big jurisdictions that have until recently sought solutions by themselves would do better to join forces and take on the opportunities and challenges of growth together.

Concluding Thoughts: Regional Challenges, Regional Approaches?

Advocates, scholars, and planners have long advocated regional solutions to the challenge of inclusion. In some states and regions, this advocacy has borne fruit with fair-share

systems that legislate the allocation of housing demand among jurisdictions (e.g., New Jersey, California, and Minneapolis-St. Paul). One of the most promising inventions of recent years in this regard, however, is the regional Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH), a voluntary approach to the requirement for planning and analysis that advances the Fair Housing Act’s affirmatively furthering fair housing (AFFH) requirement. As a precursor to the regional AFH, HUD required metropolitan planning organizations and their partners to prepare Fair Housing and Equity Assessments (FHEAs) as a condition of receiving Sustainable Communities Planning Grants (SCPGs) awarded between 2010 and 2014.

While regional AFHs are not required and HUD’s commitment to the AFFH rule under the current administration remains unknown, Chicago’s metropolitan planning organization (CMAP) is already using its FHEA as the basis for a regional AFFH. The Houston-Galveston Area Council (HGAC) also received a Sustainable Communities Planning Grant and prepared its own FHEA. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) was unsuccessful in its SCPG applications, but recent work by Urban Institute researchers as well as planners from MWCOG could form the basis of a regional AFH. The requirement for the FHEA, its evolution into the regional AFH, and the relationships built during the SCPG process among housing agencies, transit providers, regional transportation planners, and local land-use planners, may together be shifting the politics of regional planning for inclusion. The authors of these three papers have provided a good basis for future research that would explore how AFFH changes the calculus and political tactics of local stakeholders in their approaches to building more inclusive neighborhoods.

Bibliography


